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FILIBUSTER VS. SUPERMAJORITY RULE: FROM
POLARIZATION TO A CONSENSUS- AND MODERATION
FORCING MECHANISM FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONS
Brent Wible*
INTRODUCTION
Almost no one is happy with the judicial appointments process. Periodically,
those who follow the process become alarmed, identifying structural problems that
allow for too much partisanship or too much mudslinging. A wave of scholarly and
journalistic commentary followed the last great nominations conundrum: the
Senate's rejection of Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987.'
Similarly, a flood of newspaper editorials and law review articles has been published
during the last year as Democratic senators have filibustered a handful of President
Bush's nominations and Bush has employed recess nominations to fill judicial slots. 2
Recommendations for recalibrating the process have spanned the legal
landscape, from suggesting that we borrow structural approaches from other consti-
tutional systems,3 to urging a return to the Founders' principles and allocation of
authority concerning appointments.' Several commentators, both then and now,
* Law Clerk, the Honorable Allyne R. Ross, United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York; Law Clerk designate, the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; J.D., Yale Law School, 2003.
' See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Advice? Consent? Senatorial Immaturity and the Judicial
Selection Process, 101 W. VA. L. REv. 495, 495 n.l-2 (1999) (listing articles and books
written in reaction to the Senate's rejection of Judge Robert Bork's nomination and the
appointment of Justice Clarence Thomas).
2 See, e.g., John Comyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for
Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181 (2004); Dr. John C. Eastman, The
Limited Nature of the Senate's Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 633 (2003);
Laura T. Gorjanc, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in Advice
and Consent, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1435 (2004); Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an
Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist No. 76 on the Senate's Role in the Judicial
Confirmation Process, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 235 (2004); The Honorable Stephanie K.
Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken Is It?, 39 TULsA L. REv. 691
(2004).
3 See infra Part IV (providing a comparative perspective of supermajority requirements
for judicial nominations).
4 See infra Part II (discussing an originalist argument for modifying the appointments
process).
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have suggested that a supermajority voting requirement in the Senate for judicial
confirmations may be appropriate. This idea rankles some as radically recon-
structing the Founders' constitutional architecture.' Others insist that supermajority
voting would increase deliberation in the appointments process and lead to moder-
ation, producing mainstream nominations.6 Some scoff at the latter suggestion,
pointing to the polarizing effect of the current filibusters, derided as a supermajority
rule, that exacerbate partisan one-upsmanship while leaving judicial seats vacant and
adding increased burdens to already heavy federal dockets.
A number of partisan groups have attacked the current Senate filibusters as
unconstitutional, supporting a movement to reform Senate rules and decrease the
number of votes needed to break a filibuster.' Many judge the filibuster, which
brings in a supermajority rule through the back door, as unconstitutional for
tampering with the Founders' vision of a Senate giving "[a]dvice and [c]onsent ' 8 in
the nominations process by a simple majority.9 This Article does not address the
filibuster's constitutionality or whether the filibuster rule should be changed. °
Rather, it argues that the current use of filibusters to impede judicial appointments
should not be taken as the bellwether of a true supermajority confirmation
mechanism. While a true supermajority rule would empower a Senate minority, it
would be more likely to produce moderation and consensus in the confirmation
process than the filibuster. It would thus be a more beneficial long-term strategy for
both parties, as opposed to engaging in a tit-for-tat game of partisan bickering that
amplifies partisan sentiment and produces nominees outside of the mainstream.
This Article draws on history, theory, and comparative analysis to suggest that such
a rule would reinforce, rather than betray, the founding vision and that it would
likely produce substantial structural benefits.
' See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Confirmation Mystery, 83 GEO. L.J. 395,428-29
(1994) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994)).
6 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 5, at 196-98 (arguing that a supermajority requirement
would maintain quality and "screen out mediocrity").
7 See, e.g., James L. Swanson, Minority Rules: Filibustering the Constitution, DAILY
COMMENT. (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), May 6, 2003, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/05-
06-03-2.htn; Associated Press, Bush Calls for Ban on Judicial Filibusters: Estrada
Nomination Temporarily PushedAside, at http:/lwww.cnn.comI2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/ 1I/
senate.estrada.ap/ (Mar. 11, 2003).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9 See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Filibuster Preservation: Does the Senate Filibuster Need
Reform?, NATIONALREVIEw ONLINE, May 15, 2003, athttp:llnationalreview.comlcommentl
commenteastman051503.asp; Swanson, supra note 7; George Will, Unconstitutional
Filibuster, at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/georgewill/gw2003O227.shtml (Feb. 7,
2003).
"o See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,
239-45 (1997) (discussing the constitutionality of filibusters).
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In Part I, this Article surveys the various supermajority rules proposed by
lawyers and political scientists to modify the judicial confirmation process and
suggests that proponents of such rules have failed to make an adequate case for the
reform. Part II explores the drafting of the Appointments Clause and argues that the
rise of durable political parties has undermined the structural integrity of the
Founders' architecture for judicial appointments. This Part suggests that a super-
majority rule would be more faithful to the founding vision than the current process.
The Article then examines the Constitution's supermajority provisions in Part II
and evaluates the theories that have been offered to explain and justify these
departures from majority rule. This Part compares the proposed supermajority rule
for judicial confirmations to the Constitution's supermajority provisions and
measures it against the supermajoritarian theories. Part Il concludes by advancing
a set of normative and policy arguments for enacting a supermajority rule for
judicial confirmations. Part IV puts the proposal in comparative perspective,
analyzing how supermajority rules for judicial appointments have functioned in
other constitutional systems. The Article concludes that, while filibusters are prob-
lematic in that they exacerbate partisan behavior and prevent consensus, a true
supermajority rule would likely be moderation- and consensus-forcing. The Article
recognizes that while this rule, like any constitutional amendment, would be difficult
if not impossible to achieve politically, it would be a welcome reform to our
constitutional architecture.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUPERMAJORITY RULE PROPOSALS FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONS
Analysts have proposed various schemes for reforming the judicial appoint-
ments process in recent years, many of them targeting politicized nominations.
Perhaps surprisingly, life tenure has come under serious scrutiny from a bevy of
academics. Making comparative reference to the constitutional courts of several
European countries, notably Germany, theorists have argued that a single, non-
renewable term for judges would lower the political stakes in the appointments
process while ensuring that, if a particular judge became extreme once on the bench,
he or she would not be able to serve beyond an allotted term.' The idea is not new.
Thomas Jefferson championed it during the founding period, leaving open the
possibility of reappointment, in order to make judges accountable for their
" See, e.g., James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Saving This Honorable Court: A
Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable
Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093 (2004); John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics,
Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 41 (2002); Michael J. Mazza, A New Look at
an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the Article III Judge, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 131 (2004); Bruce
Ackerman, Judicial Extremism: A German Antidote, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003, at B 15.
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decisions.12 Judge Learned Hand also attacked "the fatuity of the system" that
grants life tenure.13 A second proposal that has received attention from lawyers and
political scientists in recent years is the establishment of a supermajority Senate
voting rule for judicial confirmations.14 Like a single, non-renewable term, a super-
majority rule, it is argued, would reduce partisanship in the appointments process
and push courts toward the center.
5
Bruce Ackerman originally proposed a two-thirds supermajority for judicial
confirmations as a means of assuring that "[n]o longer could an ideological
President with a weak mandate use a slim Senatorial majority to ram through a
constitutional revolution.' '16 Ackerman's latest thoughts on judicial appointments
urge us to look toward Germany's constitutional court, created after World War II,
and to consider its appointments procedure as an evolved mechanism. 17 Ackerman
sees much to learn from post-war Europe, arguing that, "since World War II, many
nations have followed the American example of judicial review, and half a century
of comparative experience should begin to serve as a precious resource for our
constitutional self-understanding."' 8 German law requires a two-thirds legislative
supermajority for appointments to its highest court.'9 Ackerman's account of the
German system suggests that "[tihe mere existence of the supermajority rule serves
as an effective deterrent," setting up the parameters ex ante so that unorthodox or
politically extreme candidates simply are not nominated.20 Ackerman most values
this moderation-forcing aspect of the supermajority rule and its potential, in the
United States, "to keep the court within the mainstream of American constitutional
values.",2' Recognizing the expanded role the federal judiciary has come to play
1" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William T. Barry (July 2, 1822), in 7 THE WRrriNGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 256 (H.A. Washington ed., 1859). Thomas Jefferson made the
following suggestion:
Let the future appointment of judges be for four or six years and
renewable by the President and Senate. This will bring their conduct at
regular periods under revision and probation and may keep them in
equipoise between the general and special governments .... That there
should be public functionaries independent of the nation . . . is a
solecism in a republic of the first order of absurdity and inconsistency.
Id.
'3 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 249 (1994) (quoting
Learned Hand, Normal Inequalities of Fortune, NEwREPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 1915, at 5 (published
anonymously)).
14 See Ackerman, supra note 11.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 25-30.
16 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 407 (1998).
'7 Ackerman, supra note 11.
18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
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since the Founding, exercising a power not foreseen at that time, Ackerman asks
"whether the framers would have left appointments to the simple majority of the
Senate if they had glimpsed the future influence of the Supreme Court."22 While
Ackerman disregards the structural difference that likely accounts for the German
approach - that German judges are appointed solely by the legislature - his
historical question is prescient, as will be examined in greater detail in Part H.
Calvin Massey also constructed an early argument in favor of a supermajority
voting rule for judicial confirmations.2 Massey argued that a supermajority rule,
by requiring agreement across the political spectrum, would produce nominations
with "broad public support" and "a healthy modicum of bipartisan support."24
Stephen Carter has similarly suggested raising the threshold of Senate consent
required for confirmation from a simple majority to a two-thirds supermajority.25
Carter finds much to commend in this proposal, above all that it would force the
president to choose nominees who are not strongly identified with a particular
ideology and who are generally respected, even by those who disagree with the
nominees philosophically.26 He argues that a supermajority rule would force
moderation and consensus.27 "Requiring a supermajority for confirmation, in other
words, would encourage consensus candidates rather than predictable ideologues. '21
Carter acknowledges a potential difficulty that a supermajority rule may present -
empowering minorities to use scare tactics and other short-term strategies to defeat
nominees they do not like.29 Although he addresses this concern only in passing,
Carter suggests that the supermajority rule would affect the appointments dynamic
such that these tactics would be unappealing, resulting in the nomination of
thoughtful judges who, while leaning to one side or the other, are fundamentally
centrists. 30 The point that Carter does not make is that it is unlikely that short-term
strategies or scare tactics employed by Senate minorities would prevail in a two-
party system, where a game-theoretic, and the threat of tit-for-tat, would more likely
emerge.
Significantly, Carter questions whether there is value in confirming some judges
by a simple majority.31 He dismisses the suggestion, however, stating that close
22 Id.
23 Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court
Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 14-16 (1991).
24 Id. at 15.
25 CARTER, supra note 5, at 196-98.
26 Id. at 197.
27 Id. at 197-98.
21 Id. at 198.
29 Id. at 196-97.
30 Id. at 196-98.
31 Id. at 198.
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votes serve only to confirm "slightly qualified or very controversial figures. 32 On
this issue there is, of course, room to differ. One could make a strong case for the
value of having diverse viewpoints represented in the federal judiciary and that such
diversity is best achieved by maintaining a majoritarian confirmation process. Put
differently, a supermajority requirement, by forcing consensus, might produce a
gallery of plain vanilla judges that fails to represent the spectrum of judicial
approaches. A second concern merits consideration against the diversity value:
balance. In the federal judiciary, ideological diversity must include balance as an
essential underpinning and counterweight. Where balance fails over time, diversity
also fails, and ideological appointments lead to an ideological judiciary. Of course,
no neat institutional means of achieving and maintaining equipoise between balance
and diversity exists. Politics - the alignment of the electoral majorities that select
Congress and the president - prevails in this domain. While one could maintain
faith in diversity nonetheless, leaving the question of balance to be determined by
electoral trends, it is an open question whether this diversity value, achieved through
a majoritarian confirmation process, outweighs the importance of having a
mainstream judiciary composed of jurists respected on all sides.33
32 Id.
33 While, seen from one perspective, appointment by the executive subject to majority
confirmation allows the federal bench to remain up to date with electoral majorities, life
tenure makes the courts, to some degree, the residue of former administrations. Justice
Jackson once wrote that "[tihe judiciary is ... nearly always the check of a rejected regime
on the one in being." ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A
STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 315 (1941). Embedded in this political
dynamic is a choice between two conceptions of balance: a balance involving the
appointment of ideological judges from a variety of perspectives, on the one hand, and an
institutionalized balance in the appointments process itself, designed to encourage the
appointment of moderate judges acceptable across the political spectrum. There seems little
virtue in the former, however, for what is achieved is only a possible balance of nomination
power, subject to electoral outcomes. There is no institutionalized check against nominations
that will continue to produce divided courts issuing plurality opinions. See John A. Ferejohn
& Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 981-82 (2002). Ferejohn and Kramer argue that the
current judicial appointment process achieves a different kind of equilibrium, balancing
judicial independence with democratic accountability:
The beauty of using appointments to control the bench is that it fosters
democratic accountability without in any way threatening judicial
independence: The political branches have a regular means to keep the
bench in line with prevailing attitudes, but individual judges are
immune from further pressure or obligation once they have been
appointed.
Id.
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Carter over-simplified when he alleged that only slightly qualified or highly
controversial nominees are confirmed by simple majorities. 34 Historically, he is
correct that most appointments have been confirmed with overwhelming
majorities.35 Nonetheless, intense partisanship, as much as the merits of any
particular nominee, may produce close votes. Whatever the factors affecting a
particular vote, it is not a foregone conclusion that a judiciary potentially repre-
senting a broad spectrum of ideological and juridical perspectives would provide
more perceived legitimacy, more continuity, or better decisions than one composed
of judges who have earned respect as moderate jurists and who are palatable across
the political spectrum. These latter values, deserving of as much consideration as
the desire for jurisprudential diversity, may correspond more with a supermajor-
itarian confirmation process. Moreover, the suggestion that a supermajority rule
would produce plain vanilla judges is at least overstated, if it does not belie the
facts. The dichotomy between majoritarian diversity and supermajoritarian
similarity is likely more illusory than real. One need only remember that Justice
Stevens and Justice Scalia, the two poles of the current Court, were both confirmed
unanimously.
3 6
Dennis Mueller has also considered the idea of a supermajority rule for judicial
appointments.37 Mueller identified a potentially troublesome dynamic in major-
itarian systems. Where simple majorities are required to enact legislation, and that
same majority has the authority to confirm judicial appointments, he argues, the
possibility of majority tyranny arises.3" This dynamic is particularly worrying
during periods of congressional-executive partisan alignment, where legislation and
confirmations can proceed relatively unhindered. Mueller's proposed solution
would give the minority a voice in judicial confirmations because, "[t]he require-
ment that the minority concur in the selection of judges is a safeguard against the
minority's inevitable defeat in both the parliament and the courts."39 The cost of
such a supermajority rule, Mueller believes, is the potential for a deadlock or
stalemate.40 He sees a tradeoff between relative efficiency in the staffing of judicial
positions on the one hand versus the impartiality of judicial nominees on the other.4
He warns that the danger of a stalemate should not be overstated because differences
on substantive issues do not preclude agreement "that a particular person can be
4 CARTER, supra note 5, at 198.
3 See Massey, supra note 23, at 15 (concluding that historically only eight confirmations
would have been reversed if a supermajority rule had been in effect, although recognizing
that such a rule would have altered confirmation dynamics).
36 See CARTER, supra note 5, at 197.
11 DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 281-84 (1996).
38 Id. at 281.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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expected to interpret the law fairly. '42 Mueller perhaps overstates the possibility of
majority tyranny, considering that interbranch partisan alignment typically does not
allow the party in power both to enact legislation and to remake the judiciary,
because only a few positions on diverse courts require filling at any time.
Nonetheless, he identifies a structural concern with majoritarian judicial confir-
mation processes that is not negligible.
John Ferejohn has made the case for a supermajority rule in the greatest
detail.43 Like Ackerman, he adopts a comparative approach. Remarking on the
"judicialization" of politics in both the United States and Europe, characterized by
a shift in power from legislatures to courts as law-making bodies, Ferejohn argues
that, because of politicized appointments and life tenure for judges, courts are
unlikely to exercise "nuanced restraint" in deciding cases.' He worries that when
courts exercise legislative powers by regulating the conduct of political activity and
even making substantive policy, their decisions often "appear to be politically
motivated" and the appointments process becomes increasingly partisan.45 Ferejohn
argues that a supermajority rule for confirmations might alter the political dynamic
of the Supreme Court, lending it greater perceived credibility. 4 "A supermajority
requirement for appointment would mean that newly appointed judges would have
to be acceptable across party and ideological lines. This would tend to discourage
the appointment of ideologically extreme judges and would probably tend to lead
to a court filled with judicial moderates."47 In an age when the Court is widely
perceived as political, having lost some of its perceived legitimacy, this would be
a welcome change. Ferejohn believes that, by changing the means of constituting
the Court, the Court's character would change as well. Ferejohn argues that a new
appointments process would lead to greater consensus among the Justices:
[R]eforms.. . would likely lead to a different kind of internal
decision-making culture in the Court. The members, being in
broad agreement, would tend to see real chances for coming to
consensual agreements on many cases. The Court would
probably begin developing practices aimed at attaining broad
agreement - even agreement based on widely shared
principles - rather than settling for determining cases by the
majoritarian rule of five. Such a development would lead to an
increased confidence in the Court both among elected and
42 Id. at 282.
4' Ferejohn, supra note 11.
44 Id. at 66.
41 Id. at 65-66.
4' Id. at 66-67.
47 Id.
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appointed officials and among the public at large. Support for
these conjectures can be obtained from the practices of other
constitutional courts.48
The constitutional courts of Germany, Italy, and Spain, each constituted, at least in
part, by supermajority legislative votes, produce consensus frequently, in stark
contrast to the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court.49 Ferejohn recognizes, however,
that a supermajority rule could have costs.
There is a chance that the Court would be reflective of the broad
center of U.S. politics but that significant minorities would not
see their views reflected. There is also a real concern that
reforming the Court will affect substantive outcomes. It is not
at all clear, however, that a Court comprised of members who
are broadly acceptable across the political spectrum will be
hostile to minorities. s
Ferejohn's comment voices the concern alluded to by Carter when he questioned the
potential value of ideological diversity on the federal bench.' It bears repeating that
it is not clear that a supermajority rule would result in the nomination of judges
of similar temperament, given the range of differences that remains within the
mainstream.
Judith Resnik has also recently argued in favor of a supermajority rule in a New
York Times editorial.5 2 Resnik focuses on two characteristics of the federal judiciary
in constructing her argument: that federal judges serve life terms and that the
number of life-tenured federal judges has expanded from around 100 in 1901 to
almost 1,000 today.53 This expansion reflects the growing importance of the federal
judiciary. That life-tenured judges have come to play such a central role in con-
temporary governance, a role not anticipated by the Founders, Resnik argues, should
persuade us to rethink the manner in which these judges are appointed.54 In an
evenly divided Senate representing a politically divided country, Resnik seems to
find it troublesome that a simple majority could shape the federal judiciary in its
own partisan image, preferring instead a supermajority rule that would weed out the
48 Id. at 67.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 CARTER, supra note 5, at 196-98.
52 Judith Resnik, Supermajority Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003, at A3.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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handful of nominees who are ill-chosen or far from the judicial mainstream."
Resnik speculates that, given the size of the federal judiciary, and the political
energy and capital that the minority party would be required to expend to oppose a
nominee, few nominees would be rejected.5 6 When at least forty-one senators
believe a nominee to be ill-suited to serve on the bench, however, she suggests that
this should give us reason to pause." Resnik's worry about minority voice in judi-
cial nominations echoes Mueller's concern.58 Given the courts' role in safeguarding
minority interests, she argues, courts should perhaps be composed with a
multivalent voice, taking into account minority interests.59
Michael Gerhardt, author of an authoritative text on the federal appointments
process, has criticized supermajority rule proposals.' He presents five basic
arguments against adopting a supermajority rule for judicial confirmations. First,
citing President Clinton's nominations of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Gerhardt
argues that "a supermajority requirement is not needed to encourage presidents to
pick consensus candidates."'" While Gerhardt is correct, the question is not whether
a supermajority rule is needed to produce consensus candidates (indeed, in some
political circumstances adequate incentives for such nominations may already
exist), but rather whether consensus candidates are generally probable without a
supermajority rule and whether such a rule would tend to produce consensus
candidates more often, even in times of interbranch partisan alignment.
Second, Gerhardt contends that "a supermajority vote would not necessarily
result in the appointment of superior judges. 62 Again, his argument skirts the issue.
The primary motivation behind the supermajority rule would not be to produce
superior judges, but to consistently produce mainstream nominees, increasing
courts' perceived legitimacy and minimizing courts' perceived partisanship. A
fitting response to Gerhardt's argument may be that while a supermajority rule may
be unlikely to produce superior judges, it would also be unlikely to produce worse
judges than the current process.
Third, Gerhardt argues that a supermajority rule could allow a "hostile faction
in the Senate" to block confirmation of a popular president's nominee. 6' A
supermajority rule would, by definition, empower a Senate minority, but the
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
'9 Resnik, supra note 52.
60 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISToRIcAL ANALYsis 295-98 (2000).
61 Id. at 296.
62 id.
63 id.
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political cost of opposing nominations would likely restrict such opposition LU a
small number of nominees. 64 This Senate minority would likely be susceptible to
political pressure if it lacked good reason for its opposition. Finally, as Resnik
argues, if a significant minority of senators strongly opposes a particular nominee,
perhaps their opinion should be respected.65
Fourth, Gerhardt argues that the Constitution's supermajority rules character-
istically create a presumption against the action in question, while constitutional
structure creates a presumption in favor of confirmation.66 Part II of this Article
contends that the "presumption against" argument inadequately characterizes the
Constitution's supermajority provisions and seems preconceived to make a super-
majority rule unattractive in the judicial confirmations context.
Gerhardt is on surer footing when he argues that the Appointments Clause
sought to balance efficiency in staffing with a check on executive power.67 He fails
to recognize, however, that political parties have undermined the majoritarian
requirement of the Founders' Constitution, creating conditions for near-automatic
confirmation in periods of interbranch partisan alignment. During these periods, the
balance is upset, tipping precariously away from checks and balances toward
efficiency. Intense partisanship in the staffing of the judicial branch may be too
high a price to pay for efficiency. While the majority rule jettisons checks in periods
of interbranch alignment, a supermajority rule would maintain a check on executive
power notwithstanding Senate composition. The key question, then, is to what
extent a supermajority rule would sacrifice efficiency in favor of checks and
balances, and whether it would tend to produce stalemate rather than consensus
candidates. Over time, the latter seems inevitable.
The various proposals for a supermajorityjudicial confirmation rule share much
in common. Several adopt a comparative approach, urging us to learn from the
constitutional experiments and the appointments processes in other parts of the
world. Each focuses on how the federal courts have changed over time - in size,
influence, and power - as reason to rethink the confirmation process. While the
Framers may have accepted Montesquieu's assumption that the judiciary is a "null
power" and an inherently weak institution, believing instead that the legislature
presented the greatest threat of consolidating power,6" history has proved this
4 Jesse J. Holland, More Battles Likely on Bush Judge Picks, AsSOcIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRES, Nov. 5, 2004, Factiva, doc. APRS000020041105e0b500cff (noting that
Democrats blocked only ten of President Bush's nominations to federal courts of appeals
during his first term, while confirming 203 appointments).
65 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
66 GERHARDT, supra note 60, at 41, 297.
67 Id. at 297.
68 Alexander Hamilton explained that "liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary
alone." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
see also id. at 437 n.64 (quoting 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 186
(Hamer Publishing Co. 1966) (1748)) ("Montesquieu speaking of them, says, 'of the three
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sentiment incorrect, spurring analysts to suggest revisiting the Constitution's
institutional checks on the judiciary's composition. Minority protection is a
common theme, as is the implicit suggestion that courts should be composed by
incorporating minority voices. All of the authors point to the moderation-forcing
dimension of the supermajority rule, lauding this revised confirmation procedure as
likely to keep courts within the mainstream of judicial and constitutional values and
to produce consensus-seeking courts that have greater perceived legitimacy. The
following Parts of this Article elaborate on each of these points - revisiting the
Founders' debates on the appointment power via the concerns most prominent at the
time, examining the theory behind supermajority rules while analyzing their
potential as moderation- and consensus-forcing mechanisms, and making a more
complete comparative analysis of judicial appointments procedures.
II. AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT FOR MODIFYING THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
Other than hoping to avoid the appointment of judges with limited judicial skill,
the Framers worried little over how the judicial appointments process would
influence the courts. Influenced heavily by Montesquieu, they understood the
judiciary, defined by its passive role of receiving and resolving cases or con-
troversies, as the least powerful of all the branches. 69 The Founders assumed that
judicial power was not something to fear.7' The main concerns dominating the
powers above mentioned, the JUDICIARY is next to nothing."'). Hamilton made the
following comparison of the judiciary to the other branches of government:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated from
each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The
executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but pre-
scribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated. The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either
the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the
wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It
may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment;
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments.
Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
69 Montesquieu wrote that, "[o]f the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next
to nothing." 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949).
70 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Hamilton explained the relationship of the judiciary to the legislative and executive branches:
[Tihe judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the
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judicial appointments debate at the Constitutional Convention revolved around state
power and the relative strength of the legislative and executive branches. As will
be argued below, the Appointments Clause ultimately sought to address these issues
by striking a balance between political accountability in the executive branch and
a political check in the Senate. In the Framers' constitutional architecture, one
based on the supposedly inherent opposing institutional interests of the three
branches, life tenure was intended as the main guarantor of judicial independence.
Majority consent by the Senate was deemed an adequate check on the executive
appointment power. Those who designed this architecture of opposing institutional
interests considered the evolution of durable political parties allowing for inter-
branch coordination an unthinkable and unwelcome development. The growth of
durable parties would eventually undermine the structural integrity of this system
of checks and balances based on institutional interests. The contemporary assump-
tion that the Founders envisioned presidential appointment with approval by a
simple majority of the Senate is thus anachronistic, obscuring the original inter-
branch logic from which the "advise and consent" formulation was conceived.
Moreover, recognizing the power that courts have come to wield,71 Montesquieu
no longer provides a workable guiding principle. These considerations should
perhaps make us rethink the judicial appointments process.
As much as any clause in the Constitution, the Appointments Clause, written in
terse, misleadingly simple language, has a drafting history that does little to clarify
its intended application or scope. Not once in the records of the Constitutional
Convention is the phrase "advice and consent" discussed or analyzed. To the
other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend
itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual
oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the
general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter:
I mean, so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
legislative and executive.
Id.
71 See, e.g., ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY
OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLICs, at viii-ix (1941); FRANK R. STRONG, JUDICIAL
FUNCTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER 153-70, 155 (1997)
(describing the "threat of an imperial judiciary"). Justice Jackson described the judiciary's
ascendancy to power as follows:
The Supreme Court has, from the very nature of its functions, been
deep in power politics from the opening of the Court .... It has moved
with such mastery that by 1933 it had established a supremacy that
could deny important powers to both state and nation on principles
nowhere found in the Constitution itself, or could allocate powers as
between state and nation, or between Congress and the executive
departments, and could largely control the economic and social policy
of the country.
JACKSON, supra, at viii-ix.
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contrary, that drafting history raises questions about what a judicial appointments
process, calibrated to embody the Framers' concerns, should look like. This Part
argues that, while evidence from the Constitutional Convention provides little
insight into the Framers' decision to adopt the "advice and consent" language, what
evidence there is nonetheless sheds significant light on the fundamental concerns
that occupied the Founders in drafting the Appointments Clause. These concerns
emerge in sharp relief from both the Convention records and the Federalist Papers.
As political parties came to play a central role in government, however, the struc-
ture the Framers chose to address their concerns has proved less robust and durable
than expected. The prominence of institutionalized political parties, which make
alliances between Congress and the executive possible and which the Framers failed
to anticipate, have undermined the original architecture of checks and balances,
particularly when Congress and the executive are controlled by the same party. This
Part argues that such alignment highlights a significant failure in the Framers'
architecture. With the benefit of hindsight, remaining true to the founding vision
requires focusing on the concerns that animated the original architecture rather
than that architecture itself. A supermajority voting rule may better embody the
Founders' concerns than the consent of a simple Senate majority.
The history of the Appointments Clause has been well-documented elsewhere. 72
I propose only to provide a brief sketch of that history to demonstrate the texture of
the debates at the Constitutional Convention and to highlight the concerns that
motivated the Framers in drafting the clause.
The original Virginia Plan presented at the Constitutional Convention proposed
vesting the judicial appointment power in the entire legislature.73 A number of
alternative proposals were tabled on June 5, the first day the Convention occupied
itself with the appointments question.74 James Wilson of Pennsylvania spoke in
favor of appointment by the executive, worrying that if this task were left to the
legislature, "[i]ntrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary conse-
quences."75 Wilson argued that vesting the appointment power in the president
would ensure responsibility, or political accountability, in one person.76 John
Rutledge of South Carolina dismissed Wilson's proposal, arguing that such a
72 See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the
Appointment Clause, 37 SYRACUSEL. REv. 1037 (1987); James E. Gauch, The IntendedRole
of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 337 (1989); Matthew D.
Marcotte, Advice and Consent: A Historical Argument for Substantive Senatorial
Involvement in Judicial Nominations, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 519 (200t-2002).
13 1 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1937) (1911) [hereinafter I FARRAND].
14 1 id. at 115-29.
71 1 id. at 119.
76 1 id.
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provision would tend too much towards monarchy.7" James Madison argued against
appointment by the entire legislature, echoing Wilson's concerns and fearing that
members would distribute appointments among themselves, bringing to the bench
legislative talents but not the requisite judicial qualifications.78 Although Madison
also rejected appointment by the executive and seemed to favor vesting the power
in the Senate, he stopped short of making an affirmative proposal, moving only to
strike the then existing provision, "appointment by the Legislature," and to consider
the issue at a later date. 9 On that same day, Alexander Hamilton proposed that the
executive nominate judges to be rejected or approved by the Senate.80 The delegates
remained divided over the issue, as is evidenced by Charles Pinckney's statement
that he would move to restore the original language providing for legislative ap-
pointment when the clause next came before the Convention for debate.8'
By the end of the day on June 5, the four basic approaches to the appointment
power that would resurface throughout the Convention had been outlined - ap-
pointment by the entire legislature, by the Senate alone, by the president alone, or
by an interbranch mechanism. The concerns raised in these discussions - on the
one hand, apprehension of monarchic power and, on the other, warnings of cabal,
intrigue, and faction - would resound each time the Convention addressed the
appointment power. In the face of these competing perspectives, the Convention
accepted Madison's proposal to strike, and the day ended by removing the Virginia
Plan's provision from the document.82
The Convention reconsidered the appointments provision on June 13, when
Edmund Randolph resubmitted an amended version of the Virginia Plan, with
Supreme Court Justices to be appointed by the Senate.83 No records reflect any
discussion between June 5 and June 13. Pinckney and Roger Sherman, the delegate
from Connecticut, moved to amend the language and return the appointment power
to the entire legislature.' 4 Madison restated his objections to appointment by the
legislature as a whole, emphasizing the lower house's particular susceptibility, by
virtue of its size, to improper influence. 85 Arguing that the Senate, being less
numerous and more select than the entire legislature, would better judge the quality
of nominees, Madison apparently convinced his fellow delegates.86 Sherman and
Pinckney withdrew their motion for appointment by the entire legislature, and
77 1 id.
78 l id. at 120.
79 l id.
80 1 id. at 128.
81 1id. at 121.
82 lid. at 120.
83 1 id. at 230.
14 1 id. at 232.
85 1 id. at 232-33.
86 1 id. at 233.
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Madison's proposal was agreed to unanimously and apparently without debate. 7
The issue thus seemed to have been decided in favor of Senate appointment early
in the Convention.
By July 18, however, the landscape had shifted for reasons not explicitly
addressed by Convention delegates in the records. A number of new proposals
concerning the appointment power were introduced that day, and, although the
delegates voted on three separate proposals, they ended the day by deciding to
resume the debate at a later date. 8 A proposal to resurrect the original Virginia Plan
provision vesting the appointment power in the whole legislature was defeated by
a two-six vote.89 The "advice and consent" formulation, echoing Hamilton's June
5 proposal but proposed on this day for the first time by Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts, was also defeated four-four.' Gorham argued that this solution
would be better than appointment by the Senate, which, as a numerous body, would
have less political accountability than the executive.9' Finally, consideration of a
new proposal by Madison to vest appointment in the executive subject to a two-
thirds Senate veto was postponed. 92 That proposal was later rejected with a three-six
vote on July 21, and, after a proposal by Oliver Ellsworth urging legislative
nomination subject to a presidential veto and a two-thirds override by the Senate
(the process adopted for the enactment of legislation),94 appointment by the Senate
was reapproved with a six-three vote.95
The tenor of the debate suggests what happened between June 13 and July 18
to unsettle the earlier agreement to vest the appointment power in the Senate. On
June 15, William Patterson, despite having agreed to the Virginia Plan's language,
introduced the New Jersey Plan for the Convention's consideration.96 This plan
proposed a radical recalibration of the representative structure of the legislative
branch, with states represented equally, regardless of size or population.97 Under the
New Jersey Plan, Supreme Court Justices would have been appointed by the
executive.98 While considering Patterson's proposal, the Convention never directly
addressed the appointments provision, and the draft language remained as it had
been, allocating the appointment power to the Senate. The Great Compromise,
87 1 id.
88 2 id. at 37-38.
9 2 id. at 37.
92 id. at 41, 38.9' 2 id. at 41.
922 id. at 38.
932 id. at 71-72.
94 2 id. at81.
9' 2 id at 72.
96 1 id. at 241-45.
97 1 id.
98 1 id. at 244.
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however, giving each state equal representation in the Senate while maintaining
proportional representation in the House, was struck on July 16.99 Madison, who
had been the most vocal champion of lodging the appointment power in the Senate,
knew that the Compromise made Senate appointment less palatable, giving small
states disproportionate power over judicial appointments." Considering this
development, Madison proposed on July 18 that the president appoint Justices
subject to a two-thirds Senate veto.'0 ' Madison gave three reasons for his proposal,
the third directly addressing the Great Compromise and the disproportionate power
small states would wield under an appointment power held by the Senate.'0 2
Madison seemed to worry that the Senate's new representative structure, and even
maintaining the Great Compromise, required vesting the appointment power in the
executive with some means of Senate oversight. Despite the fundamental change
in the proposed structure of the legislative branch wrought by the Great Compromise
and Madison's misgivings, the Convention voted to retain the existing allocation of
the appointment power in the Senate.'03
While proposals to share the appointment power between the president and the
Senate had emerged early in the Convention when Hamilton informally suggested
that the Senate have the right to reject or approve the president's nominations,1 " and
once again when Gorham introduced the "advice and consent" language, the
Convention steadfastly maintained the draft rule vesting the appointment power in
the Senate throughout the Convention. On July 24, the Convention appointed a
five-member Committee of Detail, chaired by John Rutledge of South Carolina, to
prepare a draft constitution encompassing the results of the deliberations up to that
99 2 id. at 15.
,oo 2 id. at 80-8 1.
,,2 id. at 44.
102 Madison provided the following explanation of the third reason for his proposal:
[T]hat as the 2d. b. was very differently constituted when the appoint-
ment of the Judges was formerly referred to it, and was now to be
composed of equal votes from all the States, the principle of compro-
mise which had prevailed in other instances required in this that their
shd. be a concurrence of two authorities, in one of which the people, in
the other the states, should be represented. The Executive Magistrate
wd be considered as a national officer, acting for and equally sympa-
thising with every part of the U. States. If the 2d. branch alone should
have this power, the Judges might be appointed by a minority of the
people, tho' by a majority, of the States, which could not be justified
on any principle as their proceedings were to relate to the people, rather
than to the States: and as it would moreover throw the appointments
entirely into the hands of ye Nthern States, a perpetual ground of
jealousy & discontent would be furnished to the Southern States.
2 id. at 80-81.
103 2 id. at 72.
"04 1 id. at 128.
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point.' °5  The final language of the Appointments Clause referred to the
Committee was, "That a national Judiciary be established to consist of one
Supreme Tribunal - the Judges of which shall be appointed by the second
Branch of the national Legislature."' The Committee made only minor changes,
returning a draft to the whole Convention that read, "[t]he Senate of the United
States shall have power ... to appoint... Judges of the supreme Court."' 7
On August 23, the Convention considered all of Article IX, section 1, which
then read, "[t]he Senate of the U.S. shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint
Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court."' 0 8 Convention records reveal
significant disagreement over the treaty power. 1o9 Randolph observed that "almost
every Speaker had made objections to the clause as it stood,"".. and consideration
of it was postponed."' While the delegates did not specifically address the
appointment power, as part of the section containing the treaty power, consideration
of the Appointments Clause was also postponed.' Sherman moved to refer all
postponed issues to the Committee of Eleven, composed of a member from each
state, on August 31.13 Without leaving a record of its reasons, when the Committee
of Eleven reported to the Convention on September 4, the Appointments Clause
included Gorham's formulation, shifting nomination to the executive subject to the
"advice and consent" of the Senate." 4 Curiously, without further discussion, the
Convention as a whole approved the clause unanimously on September 7, just ten
days before it adopted the new Constitution."'
While this drafting history provides little insight into the choice of the
Appointments Clause's final language, Convention debates nonetheless underscored
the Founders' key concerns. Delegates focused on four issues in their debates over
the appointment power: (1) responsibility, a term synonymous with the modem
understanding of political accountability; (2) corruption and intrigue that would
produce poor appointments; (3) the ability to evaluate nominees' qualifications; and
(4) security, a legislative check many delegates believed necessary to counter an
appointment power vested in the executive. While these issues reflected a split
among delegates who feared a strong executive on the one hand and those who were
105 2 id. at 97-98.
16 2 id. at 132.
117 2 id. at 183.
108 2 id. at 392.
109 2 id. at 392-93.
"lO 2 id. at 393.
"' 2 id. at 382-83.
112 2 id. at 383.
"3 2 id. at 473, 481.
"4 2 id. at 498.
"- 2 id. at 538-39.
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distrustful of legislatures on the other," 6 consideration of state interests -
specifically the allocation of power between small and large states - undergirded
each of these considerations. The Appointments Clause ultimately embodied a com-
promise both between small and large states and between those who feared and those
who believed in a strong executive. " 7 It may be the case that the Appointments
Clause was more a compromise on executive strength,"18 but the Great Compromise
certainly altered the terms of the debate, undermining the previous agreement to vest
the appointment power in the Senate.
Before the Great Compromise, the first three issues were predominant in the
debates. Wilson and Gorham were two of the most outspoken proponents of re-
sponsibility. Wilson argued for appointment by the executive so that judges "might
be appointed by a single, responsible person." 9 Worries about corruption were a
corollary to this concern. Appointment by a numerous body, Wilson argued, would
result in concealment and intrigue, allowing no one to be held politically
accountable for good or bad appointments. 2 ° Gorham preferred nomination by the
executive subject to the advice and consent of the Senate because "[t]he Executive
would certainly be more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of
a bad one would fall on him alone.''.
The debate over the ability to evaluate nominees' qualifications arose in several
contexts and was employed by proponents of numerous motions. On July 18,
Gunning Bedford and Gorham exchanged arguments about whether the Senate or
the executive would be better able to evaluate qualifications.' Bedford contended
that because the Senate was composed of members from various regions, it would
have more personal knowledge of potential candidates while the executive would
be forced to rely on the opinions of others in choosing nominees.'23 Gorham
countered that senators would have to rely as much as the president on citizens of
the various states for advice and suggested that, this criterion being equal, political
l"6 Oliver Ellsworth, Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry, Ben Franklin, George Mason, and
John Rutledge each "feared that granting" too much power over appointments to the
executive "would lead to monarchy." GERHARDT, supra note 60, at 17. Gouverneur Morris,
James Wilson, James Madison, Nathaniel Gorham, and Alexander Hamilton worried about
the intrigue and cabals that would result if the appointments power were vested in the
national legislature. Id.
"7 Id. at 27.
"8 Id. (arguing that the Appointments Clause "was less a compromise (at least explicitly)
between larger and smaller states than it was a compromise ultimately between those who
believed in and those who feared a strong executive").
"' 1 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 119.
120 1 id.
12 1 2 id. at 43.
122 2 id.
123 2 id.
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
accountability was a more appropriate metric by which to determine where the
appointment power should be lodged.1
24
While few scholars have emphasized the centrality of the Great Compromise to
the Appointments Clause, its importance cannot be overstated.125 The Great
Compromise shaped the ultimate debate over the Appointments Clause, causing
some influential delegates to rethink previously settled positions. The Supreme
Court, relying on statements made by Sherman and Ellsworth in the Connecticut
ratification debates,'26 has acknowledged this fact, stating that "the important
purpose of those who brought about the restriction [on the executive authority to
appoint justices] was to lodge in the Senate, where the small States had equal
representation with the larger States, power to prevent the president from making
too many appointments from the larger States."'27 While some have rejected this
position as a post hoc defense of the Constitution, arguing that the debates over the
appointment power occurred between those who favored and those who feared a
strong executive,2 8 both considerations played an important role.
The political compromise that changed the representative structure of the Senate
profoundly influenced the Convention, producing a backlash among large states
because all the powers in the draft Constitution had been based on proportional
representation in both houses of the legislature. 29 Two days after the compromise,
Madison recognized that judicial appointment by the Senate would be less palatable
under the new conditions. Having voiced opposition to appointment by the whole
legislature since the beginning of the Convention and having been the strongest
advocate in favor of Senate appointment, Madison introduced a series of proposals
124 2 id.
125 James Gauch has demonstrated the importance of the Great Compromise in the debates
over the Appointments Clause. Gauch, supra note 72, at 347-50.
126 3 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 99 ("The equal representation of the states in the senate,
and the voice of that branch in the appointment to offices, will secure the rights of the lesser,
as well as of the greater states.").
127 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119-20 (1926). The Court's emphasis was
misplaced in that it presumed Senate confirmation to be a deviation from appointment by the
executive alone. As the foregoing history demonstrates, the important shift during the debates
was from appointment by the Senate alone, approved in multiple Convention votes, to
executive nomination with Senate confirmation. William Davie, a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention from North Carolina, also explained the Appointments Clause as
a compromise between small and large states. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY
THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 122 (Jonathan Elliott ed., J.B.
Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1941) (1836). "'The small states would not agree that the House of
Representatives should have a voice in the appointment to offices; and the extreme jealousy
of all the states would not give it to the President alone." Id.
128 JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE
CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 26 (1968).
129 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 17-18.
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on July 18, each involving nomination by the executive with confirmation by the
Senate. 30 Randolph, architect of the Virginia Plan and one-time outspoken pro-
ponent of nomination by the entire legislature, also changed his opinion in the
days after the Great Compromise. On July 18, Randolph's fear of a monarchic
executive continued to dominate his thinking. He went so far as to propose that
political accountability in the Senate could be achieved by requiring senators to
record their votes. 3 ' Only three days later, however, Randolph announced himself
in favor of appointment by the executive with some Senate oversight, valuing "the
responsibility of the Executive as a security for fit appointments," and stating that
"[a]ppointments by the Legislatures have generally resulted from cabal, from
personal regard, or some other consideration than a title derived from the proper
qualifications."' 132 As Gauch has argued, "[i]t is unlikely that Randolph suddenly
realized that appointment by the legislature or the Senate, which he had supported
since submitting the Virginia Plan nearly two months before, had problems."'' 33 He
more likely reconsidered his position in light of the Great Compromise, deciding
that appointment by the executive was a more attractive alternative than giving the
small states disproportionate power over judicial appointments.13 1
Randolph's change of heart provides a window into the interlocking consid-
erations that ultimately shaped the Appointments Clause - the allocation of power
between small and large states and disagreements over how strong the executive
should be. While the Great Compromise played an important role in the debates
over the Appointments Clause, far from determining the Clause's content, it only set
the parameters for the debate that would follow, making Senate appointment, as well
as appointment by the entire legislature or the executive alone, no longer politically
tenable. Once those parameters were set, two overriding considerations came to
underpin the debates: the need to balance responsibility (political accountability)
and security (a check on executive authority).
The Great Compromise seems to have convinced Madison, who was both
fearful of a powerful president and dubious about appointment by the entire legis-
lature, that it would be necessary to blend the executive and legislative branches
in the judicial appointments context. Between July 18 and July 21, Madison made
a series of proposals for revising the Appointments Clause. 3 He first proposed
that Justices be appointed by the executive, subject to approval of one-third of the
Senate, although he had originally recorded the figure as two-fifths.'36 In defense of
his motion, Madison argued that "[t]his would unite the advantage of responsibility
130 2 id. at 42-44.
"', 2 id. at 43.
132 2id. at81.
133 Gauch, supra note 72, at 345-46.
134 See id. at 346.
135 2 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 42-44, 80-81.
136 2 id. at 42 & n.6.
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in the Executive with the security afforded in the 2d. branch agst. any incautious or
corrupt nomination by the Executive."' 37 He next proposed that the president's
nomination be subject to a two-thirds Senate veto. 3 Ellsworth, among others,
criticized the proposal as giving too much authority to the president, and it was
defeated, presumably because such a significant veto requirement would not provide
an effective security, or check, on the executive.' 39 As interesting as the proposal,
however, were the reasons Madison offered for this approach. While his third rea-
son, as noted above, addressed the Great Compromise, his first and second reasons
emphasized responsibility, or political accountability, and security, respectively. 4"
In his third proposal, Madison made clear that he was not wed to the two-thirds
veto requirement, proposing that the executive appoint judges subject to veto by
a Senate majority.' 4' As noted above, on July 21, the Convention voted three-six
to reject executive appointment subject to a Senate veto.4 2 They voted six-three in
favor of maintaining the clause as it was, with the appointment power vested in the
Senate. 43 In both votes, the large states, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Massachusetts,
constituted the minority.'"
Although the Convention reconfirmed appointment by the Senate on July 21,
sending the issue to the Committee of Eleven in late August because of disagree-
ment over the treaty power, Madison's post-Compromise proposals demonstrate a
new focus on balancing the issues of responsibility and security, or, in contemporary
'3" 2 id. at 42-43 (emphasis added).
3s2 id. at 44.
139 See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OFDEBATES IN THE FEDERALCONVENTION OF 1787,
at 345 (Ohio Univ. Press 1984) (1840).
0 Madison stated as his reasons for the motion:
1 that it secured the responsibility of the Executive who would in
general be more capable & likely to select fit characters than the
Legislature, or even the 2d. b. of it, who might hide their selfish
motives under the number concerned in the appointment - 2 that in
case of any flagrant partiality or error, in the nomination, it might be
fairly presumed that 2/3 of the 2d. branch would join in putting a
negative on it. 3. that as the 2d. b. was very differently constituted
when the appointment of the Judges was formerly referred to it, and
was now to be composed of equal votes from all the States, the
principle of compromise which had prevailed in other instances
required in this that their shd. be a concurrence of two authorities, in
one of which the people, in the other the states, should be represented.
The Executive Magistrate wd be considered as a national officer, acting
for and equally sympathising with every part of the U. States.
2 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 80-81.
'41 2 id. at 82.
142 2 id. at 71-72.
14 2 id. at 72.
'44 2 id. at 72 n.3.
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terms, political accountability and checks and balances. 45 These two concerns
were eventually embodied in the "advice and consent" language adopted by the
Convention delegates. Govemeur Morris aptly summarized the nature of the
"advice and consent" compromise on September 7, when the final formulation was
approved by the Convention, saying "as the President was to nominate, there would
be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security."'"6
These two concerns, as much for the wisdom they contain as for their important
role in balancing the various interests threatening to undo the Constitutional
Convention, above all tensions between large and small states and disagreements
over the extent of executive power, should drive our interpretation of the
Appointments Clause today.
Commentary in The Federalist reflects this desire to balance "responsibility"
and "security." In several of his publications as Publius, Hamilton addressed these
two concerns. While he believed that "[t]he sole and undivided responsibility of one
man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to
reputation," he indicated that individual accountability should be supplemented.'47
"The possibility of rejection [by the Senate] would be a strong motive to care in
proposing."'" In The Federalist No. 77, Hamilton addressed this balance directly:
[T]he restraint [imposed by the Senate] would be salutary, at the
same time that it would not be such as to destroy a single ad-
vantage to be looked for from the uncontrouled agency of that
magistrate. The right of nomination would produce all the
good of that of appointment and would in a great measure avoid
its ills.
49
Having distinguished between the executive and Senate powers concerning
appointment in The Federalist No. 66, Hamilton emphasized the value of the
"advice and consent" language as maintaining political accountability while
'45 It is tempting to speculate, given the large states' opposition to vesting the appointment
power in the post-compromise Senate, that Madison negotiated behind the scenes to ensure
some form of appointment by the executive with approval by the Senate.
' 2 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 539.
'41 THEFEDERALISTNO. 76, at 510-11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
148 Id. at 513.
It will readily be comprehended, that a man, who had himself the sole
disposition of offices, would be governed much more by his private
inclinations and interests, than when he was bound to submit the
propriety of his choice to the discussion and determination of a
different and independent body; and that body an entire branch of the
Legislature.
Id.
49 THE FEDERALST NO. 77, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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avoiding vesting too much authority in the executive. 5° Madison had invoked
similar logic in The Federalist No. 38, implying his approval of an active oversight
role for the Senate when he argued that the Appointments Clause was designed to
strike a balance between executive power and legislative involvement beginning at
the early stages of the appointment process.' 51
If a change from confirmation by majority vote to a supermajority rule were to
be considered, some might find it tempting to resist by citing Madison's proposal
that presidential nominations be subject to a two-thirds Senate veto. 52 In recent
Senate testimony, in fact, this single proposal has been distorted and presented as
evidence that Madison preferred a "preeminent" role for the president in judicial
appointments.55 For both structural and historical reasons, this emphasis is mis-
placed. Structurally, at least one supermajority veto exists in the Constitution. 54
While a supermajority is required to override a presidential veto of legislation -
essentially a veto of the president's veto - this structure is not analogous to the
appointments context. In the appointments context, presidential and Senate
authority is blended. Other interbranch blendings of power in the Constitution, most
notably the treaty power, require Senate approval.'55 Both because the super-
majority veto proposal lacked coherence with other supermajority provisions that
were approved, and because many delegates at the Convention feared that a super-
majority veto would vest too much power in the president, this proposal of
Madison's did not garner much traction.' 56 Moreover, the supermajority veto was
only one of Madison's proposals and not the most prominent. Madison himself said
that "[hie had given this form to his motion chiefly to vary it the more clearly from
one which had just been rejected."'5 7 The rest of his proposals would have
required Senate approval of the president's nominations, by minority, majority, or
supermajority vote."" Judging by the number of "veto" and "approval" proposals
Madison made, Madison arguably viewed Senate approval as the best means of
exercising a robust check on the executive's nomination power.
"5 THE FEDERALIST No. 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
' THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 245 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
152 2 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 44.
153 Hijacking the Confirmation Process: The Filibuster Returns to Its Brigand Roots:
Hearing on "Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority Is
Denied Its Right To Consent Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, 108th
Cong. 7 (2003) (prepared testimony of Dr. John C. Eastman, Professor of Constitutional
Law, Chapman University School of Law, and Director, The Claremont Institute Center for
Constitutional Jurisprudence), available at http://www.claremont.org/static/pdf/eastman-
testimony.pdf (May 6, 2003).
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
15 ld. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
156 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 80-82.
15 2 id. at 82.
151 2 id. at 42, 80.
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The Sulreme Court has made consistent reference to these founding documents,
records from the Constitutional Convention and The Federalist, in interpreting the
Appointments Clause. While the Court has never examined what balance of power
the language of the Appointments Clause establishes between the president and the
Senate, and may be unlikely to do so,'59 a number of cases have determined whether
particular appointed officials are subject to the advice and consent of Congress
before they may serve.'t6 In these cases, the Court has given priority to founding
documents in interpreting the Appointments Clause. 16 1 While the Supreme Court
recognized in Edmond v. United States that "[t]he Framers anticipated that the
President would be less vulnerable to interest-group pressure and personal
favoritism than would a collective body,"'62 the Court also noted that the Senate's
participation "serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power, and
'to promote a judicious choice of (persons] for filling the offices of the union." 63
In Freytag v. United States, the Court explained that the Appointments Clause, and
"the separation-of-powers concept embedded" therein, guards against "the danger
of one branch's aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch, . . . and
preserves another aspect of the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing the
diffusion of the appointment power."' 64 The opinion went on to emphasize that "the
structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one
branch of Government but of the entire Republic."' 65 These cases suggest that it is
appropriate to use historical evidence to determine how best to preserve the
structural integrity of the Appointments Clause. Just as that integrity can be under-
mined by one branch's aggrandizing moves and by the diffusion of the appointment
power, it can equally be undermined by interbranch partisan alignments that undo
the carefully calibrated structural checks and balances that were central to the
Framers' Constitution. The Founders' structural integrity, based on balancing insti-
tutional interests that were believed to be inherently antagonistic, is undermined in
' See generally Lee Renzin, Note, Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction - Is Judicial
Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1739, 1752-56 (1998) (arguing that judicial
resolution of the meaning of "advice and consent" is unlikely).
" See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 666 (1997) (holding that Coast
Guard criminal appeals judges are not subject to advice and consent because they are
"inferior Officers" who may be appointed by Secretary of Transportation); Freytag v.
Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 892 (1991) (holding that tax court judges are subject to advice and
consent because they exercise significant powers comparable to those of Article III courts);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (holding that independent counsel are not
subject to advice and consent because authority for appointments is vested in judiciary).
161 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659-60,663; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870, 883-84; Morrison, 487
U.S. at 674-75.
162 520 U.S. at 659.
163 Id. (citations omitted).
'64 501 U.S. at 878.
161 Id. at 880.
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our modem partisan system when there is partisan alignment between the Senate and
the executive branch. The Constitution's originally intended institutional checks fail
to function in this instance. To understand the Founders' structure, and therefore
how to maintain its integrity, we must consider the profound structural change the
development of political parties wrought."6 The rise of political parties has trans-
formed what was believed to be a durable Senate check on executive authority over
appointments into a check that withers when the Senate and the executive are
controlled by the same party, fundamentally altering the Constitution's structure.
Professor Michael Gerhardt has recognized the effect that the rise of political
parties has had on the federal appointments process. 167 He devoted the bulk of his
analysis of parties' role in judicial appointments, however, to an archaeology of the
partisan "spoils system.' ' 168 He largely avoided the structural issue, posing the
question whether political parties have "somehow frustrated the framers' original
aspirations or design" without seriously considering whether the growth of parties
after the founding period undermined the Framers' constitutional order. 169
A few prescient individuals aside, the Framers did not foresee the development
of political parties or partisanship as central to the American political process. That
the Framers did not appreciate the role that political parties would play is now well
accepted, and some scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that the
Constitution was institutionally incomplete from the outset because of its failure to
anticipate parties. 70 The Founders' concern primarily involved balancing the
branches against each other, giving each branch checks and balances against the
" The growth of political parties in the early years of the Republic had implications for
a number of constitutional provisions. For example, a number of Framers worried about
including an impeachment power in the Constitution for fear that it would be used politically.
The "emergence of political parties" led many founders to think "their fears about possible
misuse of impeachment had been greatly understated." Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 33,
at 978.
167 GERHARDT, supra note 60, at 50-60.
168 Id. at 54-60.
169 Id. at 60.
"' See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF
LEGrrIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 9-24 (1969) (noting
Founders' general antipathy toward political parties). Hofstadter comments that the Framers
all seemed to agree "that an effective constitution [would be] one that successfully
counteract[ed] the work of parties." Id. at 53; see also Michael C. Dorf, The 2000
Presidential Election: Archetype or Exception?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1279, 1295 (2001) ("The
United States Constitution was flawed from the outset - not just morally flawed because
it condoned slavery, but institutionally incomplete because of the Framers' failure to antic-
ipate the development of political parties."); John V. Orth, Presidential Impeachment: The
Original Misunderstanding, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 587, 588 (2000) ("It is a commonplace
of American constitutional history that the Framers did not foresee the development of a
system of durable nationwide political parties.").
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others.'' Theirs was a tripartite constitutional architecture in which they perLr, v1u
institutional interests, rather than partisanship, to predominate.' From this per-
spective, they conceived a certain unity of interest among legislators qua legislators,
who would be animated by institutional identity and interest to remain vigilant
against encroachments of power from the other branches. They foresaw greater
identity and unity among senators, vis-A-vis the executive, than they thought would
be possible between a group of senators and the executive.'73 The idea that partisan
politics would align a significant portion of the legislature with the executive did not
inform their architecture of checks and balances. Their structural framework was
premised on the notion that the Senate, with institutional interests inherently op-
posed to those of the executive, would place an important check, or, in the terms of
the Constitutional Convention, an important security, on the presidential appoint-
ment power. The modem dynamic, with strong partisan alliances linking the Senate
and the executive, leaves the Framers' architectural checks and balances in need of
recalibration.
The modem partisan dynamic, which has largely replaced the institutional
dynamic, leaves essentially no check on the presidential appointment power when
a majority of senators are members of the president's political party, absent the
politically costly filibuster. Certainly the Framers did not intend their intricate
architecture of checks and balances to dissipate under these conditions. Moreover,
the possibility that these fifty-one senators could represent a minority of the national
population further upsets an allocation of power intended both to restrain any one
branch's authority and to ensure, in Madison's formulation, that judges not be
appointed by a majority of states but by a minority of people.'" Given the partisan
'' See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-53 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
172 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 170, at 1296 ("The Madisonian system of checks and
balances depends upon government bodies pursuing discrete institutional interests rather than
the interest of whichever party happens to control a given body.").
171 In the words of Richard Hofstadter,
While most of the Fathers did assume that partisan oppositions
would form from time to time, they did not expect that valuable
permanent structures would arise from them .... The solution, then,
lay in a nicely balanced constitutional system, a well-designed state
which would hold in check a variety of evils, among which the divisive
effects of parties ranked high. The Fathers hoped to create not a system
of party government under a constitution but rather a constitutional
government that would check and control parties. . . . Although
Federalists and Anti-Federalists differed over many things, they do not
seem to have differed over the proposition that an effective constitution
is one that successfully counteracts the work of parties.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 170, at 53.
"' 2 FARRAND, supra note 73, at 80-81.
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political conditions in which appointments are now made and that the Framers did
not foresee, appealing to original practice to support a robust presidential appoint-
ments power is simply historically inaccurate. A more historically sensitive strategy
would identify, as this Article has attempted to do, the concerns the Framers
intended to target with their constitutional architecture and to analyze those concerns
through a contemporary lens. As argued above, the overriding concerns that led to
the "advice and consent" compromise were essentially two-fold: (1) ensuring polit-
ical accountability for appointments by lodging the appointment power in one
official, the executive, and (2) providing security, a check on the executive appoint-
ment power, via the Senate. In a world where institutional interests were presumed
to predominate, this architecture would have been effective at weeding out those
judicial nominees who were either ill-qualified or extremist. The Senate, presumed
to have an inherent institutional interest in opposing the executive, likely would
have provided an adequate check on the president's appointments. Today, however,
institutional interests play only a small role in the appointments process, where
partisan politics dominate. The Framers' structure is inadequate in this world.
While political parties were an unexpected development that the Framers did not
accommodate in designing their constitutional architecture (hoping, in fact, to
impede their formation), it is now commonly believed that the development of
durable parties, although extraconstitutional, was necessary. 17 5 The Madisonian
strategy of dividing power among branches and between the federal government and
the states to preserve liberty presented the danger of governmental paralysis, with
each institution frustrating the will of the others. 17 6 Political parties have facilitated
175 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 170, at 1296; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUmVI. L. REv. 215, 274 (2000) ("The
rudimentary parties that emerged by 1800... did mark a dramatic change in the structure
of constitutional government - answering the Anti-Federal challenge by providing the
institutional support needed to sustain republican government on an extended scale.");
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1459, 1484 (2001). Prakash and Yoo argue that parties
were necessary to overcome inefficiency created by the Constitution:
Parties formed to overcome the manner in which the Constitution
divided governmental authority in the United States. Both the
separation of powers and federalism threatened to make the rational
exercise of government power impossible. Political parties arose in
order to "organiz[e] the majorities necessary to fill offices and adopt
policies."
Id. (quoting Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Political Parties and American Constitutionalism, in
AMERICAN POLrCAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUIONAL PoLmncs 3 (Peter W. Schramm &
Bradford P. Wilson eds., 1993) (alteration in original)).
176 See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
200 (1908) ("[T]he danger of cotrdinate and coequal powers such as the framers of the
Constitution had set up was that they might at their will pull in opposite directions and hold
the government at a deadlock which no constitutional force could overcome .. ").
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coordination among branches and between the levels of government, reducing me
risk of gridlock. Sidney Milkis, a leading political scientist who has studied this
issue, has written that "[t]he two-party system has played a principal part in
combining the separated institutions of constitutional government, thus centralizing
government sufficiently for it to perform its essential duties.' 77 Because the
Framers feared that an efficient government would threaten liberty, they created an
intricate separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism; political parties
have helped overcome these constitutional structures, which debilitate the govern-
ment's ability to act, providing an extraconstitutional means of coordinating
government operations. Political parties have thus recalibrated the Framers' consti-
tutional structure, introducing an efficiency-producing means of coordination where
the Framers intended to weaken government, atomizing political power and making
its exercise difficult in the interest of preserving liberty.
Partisan alignments between Congress and the executive clearly facilitate
judicial appointments and, absent the use of filibusters, encourage efficiency over
gridlock. One must question, however, whether there are limits to the value of
efficiency and whether, particularly in the staffing and composition of the judicial
branch, a measure of the Madisonian vision of divided power should not be restored.
While the original balance between the demands of efficiency in the day-to-day
activities of government and the wisdom of dividing power so as to preserve liberty
may have been recalibrated for the better by the development of political parties,
judicial appointments may merit a different calculus. In the appointments context,
particularly in periods of Senate-executive partisan alignment, the need for a
meaningful check on executive authority outweighs the alternative - efficiency in
staffing without any meaningful check at all.
While no easy metric exists for determining where political parties' facilitation
role interferes too much with the founding vision of checks and balances, judicial
appointments seem to be the easy case. Such checks are particularly important
when the composition of one of the three branches of government is at issue. A
recalibrated system in which a three-fifths or two-thirds supermajority of senators
is required to confirm judicial nominees would address the concerns that animated
the Founders, ensuring political accountability in the executive and a check on
presidential appointments in the Senate that is meaningful regardless of temporary
electoral outcomes. Such a rule would undermine the elegance of a single
Appointments Clause covering all federal appointments, creating a different rule
for federal judges than for other appointees, but when the composition of one of
the three branches of government is at stake, the virtue of uniformity loses some
of its luster.
177 SIDNEY M. MILKIS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT:
REMAKING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (1999).
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111. SUPERMAJORITY RULES, THE CONSTITUTION, AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
The notion that the American democratic system is fundamentally majoritarian,
that majority vote is the only truly democratic means of making decisions, and thus,
that a supermajority rule forjudicial confirmations would run counter to our deepest
democratic commitments should be dispelled immediately. This kind of argument
obscures more than it clarifies. American democracy and the negotiated process of
creating and shaping democratic institutions bely such an understanding.
The Electoral College, as Americans know too well, allows a president to be
elected despite losing the popular vote. The Congress is also fundamentally anti-
majoritarian in at least one sense, with each state having equal representation in the
Senate, notwithstanding striking population asymmetries. The Great Compromise
that produced the Senate's representative structure is an example of a common trend
in states transitioning to democracy. In such states, minority groups, whether
identifiable by geography, ethnicity, religion, or other commonality, often shy from
committing to constitutional structures in which, as perpetual minorities, their voices
likely would remain unheard because of majoritarian rules. In fact, the Articles of
Confederation that preceded the Constitution required that Congress secure a
supermajority before most actions could be taken, largely because states feared the
national government would displace their authority.'78 Having one house of
Congress composed by equal representation of geographic sub-districts is only one
solution to this antimajoritarian precommitment problem, yet it demonstrates that
the negotiated process of creating and sustaining democracy, rather than being
permeated with majoritarian structures, must often involve structures that empower
minorities.' Thus, rather than being fundamentally undemocratic, some anti-
majoritarian structures serve as the architectural foundation that makes democracy
possible.
17' ARTICLES OFCONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 6 (U.S. 1777) (requiring a vote of nine out
of thirteen states to take various actions, including engaging in war, entering into treaties,
coining money, borrowing money, and appropriating money).
' For example, "minority veto" provisions are common in ethnically plural societies.
Anna Moraweic Mansfield, Ethnic but Equal: The Quest for a New Democratic Order in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2052, 2083 (2003). "Belgium's constitution
provides for a minority veto for any bill 'affecting the cultural and educational interests of
the language groups' and requires two-thirds approval by each chamber of the legislature as
well as a majority of the representatives from the affected group for the provision to take
effect." Id. at 2084-85 n.136. John Calhoun's notion of a "concurrent majority" to protect
Southern interests is synonymous with the minority veto. Id. at 2084 n.136; see AREND
LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATrVE EXPLORATION 37 (1977).
Proportional representation is also common in ethnically plural democracies where power
is allocated to groups according to their numeric strength rather than along the "winner takes
all" logic of majority rule. Id. at 41-42.
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The remainder of this Part examines supermajority provisions in me
Constitution, considering theories that explain why the Founders chose super-
majority rules in certain cases. It suggests that a supermajority rule in the judicial
confirmations context would not offend the most plausible of these theories.
Moreover, it argues that the importance of quality decision making militates in favor
of a supermajority rule for judicial confirmations. It concludes that, understanding
the changed circumstances since the founding period, these arguments for a
supermajority rule should weigh heavily.
The original U.S. Constitution contained seven explicit supermajority provi-
sions: (1) treaties cannot be ratified without approval by two-thirds of the Senate; 80
(2) a two-thirds Senate vote is necessary before an executive official or a judge can
be convicted in an impeachment trial;' l (3) expulsion of a congressman requires
a two-thirds vote of his or her house; 18 2 (4) a two-thirds vote of both houses of
Congress is necessary to override a presidential veto;' 83 (5) when the Electoral
College produces deadlock, a two-thirds quorum of state delegations is necessary
before the House of Representatives can select the president;' 8' (6) constitutional
amendments require both a two-thirds vote of Congress to propose an amendment
or of the states to call a convention to propose an amendment, and a three-fourths
vote of the states to ratify it;'8 . and finally, (7) nine of the thirteen states were
required to ratify the Constitution before it would go into force. 8 6 In addition to the
supermajority provisions included in the originally drafted Constitution, several
supermajority provisions have been proposed, debated, and added to our architecture
of governance.' 87
180 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
181 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
182 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
"' Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
"4 Id. art. 11, § 1, cl. 3.
185 Id. art. V.
186 Id. art. VII.
187 Two supermajority rules became part of the Constitution by amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment restricts persons who had served as government officials and then
joined the Confederacy during the Civil War from undertaking various offices of public trust
without a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment contains a provision that allows Congress by a two-thirds vote to
approve a suspension of the president over his objection when the vice president and a
majority of the cabinet have concluded that he is unable to discharge his duties. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXV, § 4. Supermajority rules have been vocally supported in other contexts, too.
The Hartford Convention, during the aftermath of the War of 1812 and the national divisions
that manifested themselves after the war, proposed that a two-thirds vote of both houses be
required to admit a new state, interdict trade, or declare war. 1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 149 (7th ed. 1991). During the
Great Depression, New Dealers proposed requiring a supermajority vote of the Supreme
Court to hold federal laws unconstitutional. See 2 id. at 48 1; cf Jed Handelsman Shugerman,
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While neither records from the Constitutional Convention nor The Federalist
reveal an explicit, coherent rationale for the Constitution's supermajority provisions,
a number of theories have been proposed to explain them. Kathleen Sullivan has
argued that the Framers used supermajority provisions only in "extraordinary
situations implicating either individual rights or interbranch or intergenerational
checks and balances."' 88 Some interpret the supermajority provisions as advancing
the Framers' separation of powers goals.'89 "A third view sees the Constitution's
supermajority voting provisions as part of a 'finely crafted' document that was the
result of bargaining and careful structural manipulation."' 9 Others have suggested
that the Framers used supermajority rules to promote deliberation and consensus on
certain issues "to prevent rash decision making."' 9' Finally, citing Madison's
justification at the Convention for a supermajority rule for member expulsion, that
"the right of expulsion ... was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of
a quorum,"' 92 it is often suggested that supermajority rules were included in certain
provisions because of their significance in the governmental structure.'93
A more recent analysis takes a different tack, arguing that the Constitution's
supermajority provisions "have one of two things in common: they either relate to
important actions taken unicamerally by state representation or provide for the
Congressional reversal of a decision previously taken by another 'majority rule'
entity."194 According to Brett King, presidential impeachment, expulsion of a
senator, and approving treaties are the important actions taken unicamerally by the
A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REv.
893 (2003) (advocating adoption of such a rule today). Two recent proposals sought to
restrain the federal government's fiscal powers by creating a supermajority rule for raising
debts and taxes in the Balanced Budget and Tax Limitation Amendments in 1994. H.R.J.
Res. 1, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995) (Balanced Budget Amendment); H.R.J. Res. 62, 105th Cong.
§ 1 (1997) (Tax Limitation Amendment).
18' Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 691, 697-98 (1996); see also Brett W. King, The
Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution: The Framers, The Federalist Papers and
the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principal, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363,400 (1998)
(positing reasons why the Framers included supermajority provisions in the Constitution).
"' King, supra note 188, at 400 & n.160.
190 Id. at 400.
191 Id. at 401; see, e.g., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities: Hearings on
Constitutional Amendment on Tax Increase Votes Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 15, 1995 (statement of Lloyd N. Cutler, Co-
founder, Concord Coalition) ("The present constitution requires supermajority votes in a very
limited number of cases, where the Framers regarded a high degree of consensus as more
important than the gridlock resulting from a failure to obtain the required supermajority.").
192 King, supra note 188, at 401 & n.164.
'9' Id. at 401 &n.163.
'94 Id. at 406.
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Senate that require supermajority vote. 95 Expelling a member from either house,
overriding a presidential veto, impeachment, and amending the Constitution each,
in some way, involve the congressional reversal of a previous majoritarian
decision.196 In both cases, King argues, the Constitution's supermajority provisions
counteract what would otherwise be a countermajoritarian structure in the
Constitution.1 97
King's framework is attractive in some respects. First, that congressional
reversals of previous majority decisions would require supermajority vote is
intuitively satisfying. Congressional override of a presidential veto, for example,
would render meaningless the president's veto if it did not require a supermajority.
It is logical that a similar principle should apply to impeachment of elected officials.
Second, while state size generally does not correlate with positions on particular
issues today, the Framers were anxious about the relationship between small and
large states. Unicameral Senate action was preferred by the Framers on some issues,
but the fact that a majority of states representing a minority of the population could
prevail under majority rule undoubtedly troubled some Framers - an anxiety that
led to the adoption of supermajority rules. Although a supermajority rule for these
unicameral Senate actions could prevent large states from enacting measures even
though they contained a majority of the population, this kind of rule would reduce
the likelihood that small state senators could enact a measure without representing
a majority of the population. Given the Framers' notorious bias against government
action, this trade-off may have been viewed as worthwhile.
King's analysis, however, leaves a significant stone unturned. He does not
address what, if any, criteria were used to qualify certain unicameral actions as
warranting a supermajority vote. Senate confirmation of judicial nominees is a
unicameral action for which the Constitution did not create a supermajority rule.
King offers no reason why the appointments power should have evaded the logic of
unicameral supermajorities. A finer dissection of King's two categories suggests
one possibility. Of the actions taken unicamerally by the Senate and subject to a
supermajority vote, only one, treaty approval, could not also fall into his other
category - reversal of a previous majoritarian decision. What explains this sui
generis case? The Founders viewed decision making by equal state representation
in this case to be inadequate. More specifically, the Founders likely adopted a
supermajority rule in this context because the Senate acts unicamerally, albeit with
the president, and the action taken through treaties was thought to profoundly affect
states as states. 9 The effect of treaties on states was thought to be so significant
'95 Id. at 408.
196 id.
197 id.
198 David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1135 (2000).
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that the Founders granted a minority veto against treaty ratification. Not perceiving
the Appointments Clause to affect states but rather to affect the people, the Founders
required a simple majority for judicial confirmations. As argued above, however,
the Founders' view of inherent institutional animosity among the three branches
obscured the need for more than a simple majority to protect the people from ill-
considered appointments.
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have gone further than any of these
authors, seeking not simply to explain whether there is any coherence underlying the
Constitution's supermajority provisions, but arguing that the "central principle
underlying the Constitution is governance through supermajority rules."' 99 They
argue that the Framers used "supermajority rules as a means of improving legislative
decision making in various circumstances where majority rule would operate
poorly."2"° Three of their insights are particularly instructive when applied to the
judicial confirmations context.
First, they argue that supermajority rules may improve decision making where
the decision could not be repealed by a majority. 20' Given life tenure, the appoint-
ment of federal judges is an irrevocable decision that could only be reversed via the
infrequently used supermajority impeachment process. This permanence should
make us wary of confirming nominees by a simple majority. While senators pre-
sumably should take into account the irrevocability of their decisions when voting
for or against confirmation, they are likely to be guided more by short-term
incentives, such as accountability to the party leadership.2" In light of these con-
siderations, a supermajority rule may improve decision making in this context.
Second, McGinnis and Rappaport argue that, where decisions are best made on
the basis of consensus, supermajority rules may also be beneficial." 3 Consensus is
particularly valuable in the judicial confirmations context, given the courts' intended
nonpartisan role in interpreting the law. In contrast to growing perceptions of a
highly politicized judiciary and a Supreme Court that routinely issues plurality
opinions, a supermajority, consensus-forcing rule should shore up judicial indepen-
dence, restoring confidence in the courts.
Finally, they argue that supermajority rules may be wise where the costs of
decision making are asymmetrical.2 4 In other words, a supermajority rule would be
advisable where the cost of acting badly outweighs the cost of refusing to act.205
9 John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80
TEX. L. REv. 703,705 (2002).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 739-41.
202 Id. at 740.
203 Id. at741.
204 Id. at 739.
205 id.
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The appointments process currently encourages "political solidarity"; 2°6 those who
diverge from the party line often incur substantial political costs. Unlikely to be
held accountable electorally for their votes on judicial nominees, but facing serious
consequences within their party, senators might be too willing to support their
president's nominees, regardless of their position on the merits. 2 7 Given the
irrevocable nature of appointing judges with life tenure and the importance of
consensus to maintain confidence in the federal judiciary, the cost of confirming a
marginally qualified or highly political nominee arguably outweighs the cost of
refusing a qualified one. Rather than tilting the scales against confirmation, how-
ever, a supermajority rule should have the ex ante effect of producing consensus
nominees. A serious potential cost of the supermajority rule would be gridlock -
the failure to appoint judges at all. This decision-making cost, including the time
and effort to build the supermajority required to approve nominations, would be
prohibitive if it effectively damaged the confirmations process, leaving the federal
judiciary understaffed. As noted throughout this Article, however, by providing a
basis for partisan criticism, a filibuster is more likely to produce this gridlock than
a true supermajority rule that defines ex ante the parameters under which
appointments occur.
McGinnis and Rappaport's framework provides a theoretical grounding for a
supermajority rule for judicial confirmations. Others, however, reject the propo-
sition out of hand. Writing specifically about why a supermajority provision should
not be required for judicial confirmations, Michael Gerhardt has argued that,
[t]he Framers reserved a two-thirds supermajority voting
requirement as a means of creating apresumption against certain
decisions that it expected to arise only infrequently, ensuring
greater deliberation on a matter, decreasing the chances for
political or partisan reprisals on removals and treaty ratifi-
cations, and protecting an unpopular minority from being abused
in Senate votes on these questions."'
While facially attractive, Gerhardt's understanding both lacks nuance and seems
conceived, with its emphasis on a "presumption against" action, to reject a super-
majority rule for confirmation. His "presumption against" argument fails to
adequately describe the Constitution's supermajority provisions.
A few examples should elucidate the flaws in his interpretation. First, the
congressional supermajority required to override a president's veto is grounded
more in logic than in the Framers' supposed intent to create a presumption against
overrides. As noted above, if a supermajority vote were not required, the president's
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veto would be meaningless. Second, while some Framers may have anticipated
George Washington's concern with "entangling alliances, 209 the two-thirds
requirement to approve treaties was not animated by this concern. Rather, the
recognition that states would be profoundly affected by treaties led the Framers to
vest the treaty power in the Senate, where states were equally represented, and even
to grant a minority veto.2'0 A third and final example is the constitutional amend-
ment process. Certainly the Framers intended that the Constitution would not be
easy to amend, but to suggest that the supermajority requirements for amendment
reflect a presumption against amendment demonstrates misplaced emphasis. A
more faithful historical and structural explanation is that the Framers meant to
demand the same process for amendment as was required for original enactment.
This original high bar was set not as a presumption against enactment of the
Constitution (an absurd proposition), but as essential to the drafting and adoption of
fundamental, higher law generated by consensus. Gerhardt's categorical analysis,
while plausible at first glance, is not sensitive enough, failing to adequately char-
acterize the Constitution's supermajority provisions. It seems conceived more to
criticize a proposed supermajority rule for confirmations than to explain this
constitutional structure.
The Constitution's supermajority provisions, while raising the bar, did not create
a presumption against action. Although historical evidence presents no express
rationale for the supermajority provisions included in the Constitution, a more apt,
albeit general, characterization is that they were intended to promote good decision
making in instances where majority rule would have proved problematic in some
respect. While the Framers did not create a supermajority rule for judicial appoint-
ments, such a rule would not offend the most plausible justifications for those
supermajority rules that were adopted. Given the changed circumstances since the
09 George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 76 (Thomas G. Patterson ed., 1989).
210 Golove, supra note 198, at 1135. The unlimited scope of the treaty power, as opposed
to the limited legislative powers enumerated in the Constitution, also contributed to the
supermajoritarian requirement. Alexander Hamilton explained the need to guard the treaty
power:
[I]t was understood by all to be the intent of the [treaty] provision
to give to that power the most ample latitude to render it competent to
all the stipulations, which the exigencies of National Affairs might
require - competent to the making of Treaties of Alliance, Treaties of
Commerce, Treaties of Peace and every other species of Convention
usual among nations .... And it was emphatically for this reason that
it was so carefully guarded; the cooperation of two thirds of the Senate
with the President being required to make a Treaty.
Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVIII, in THE [NEW YORK] HERALD; A GAZETTE
FOR THE COUNTRY, Jan. 9, 1796, reprinted in XX THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
22 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
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founding period, such a rule may in fact be appropriate. First, given the irrevo-
cability of judicial appointments, the value of consensus in the confirmation of
nominees, and the asymmetrical consequences of appointments, the confirmation
process could be improved through a supermajority rule. The extraordinary growth
in the number and power of federal courts since the founding - a development that
the Framers did not anticipate - makes improved decision making in this context
all the more important. Second, although blended with the exclusive nominating
authority of the executive, the confirmation process is performed unicamerally by
the Senate. The Framers did not understand appointments to implicate states in the
way that treaties did, and they thus created a simple majority rule for appointments
as opposed to the supermajority they required for treaty approval. The Framers
presumably assumed that a majority vote of states, equally represented, would be an
adequate check on the presidential nomination power. As the preceding Part
explained, however, the Framers failed to anticipate the growth of durable political
parties, and the structural check they envisioned dissipates when the Senate and the
executive are controlled by the same party.21" ' While the threat of gridlock should
not be discounted, a supermajority rule for judicial confirmations would not offend
the founding vision, would be congruent with the supermajority provisions already
existing in the Constitution, and would likely improve decision making, creating
stable, moderate courts with perceived legitimacy.
IV. SUPERMAJORTY VOTING REQUIREMENTS FOR JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Some American lawyers in academia have despaired that "[ilt is difficult to find
anyone who is satisfied with the way Supreme Court Justices are appointed
today. 2 12 Constitutional courts with the power ofjudicial review have proliferated
since midcentury, and Americans now have a number of alternative appointment
processes to consider. As noted above, Ackerman has argued that Americans should
adopt a "German antidote" to judicial extremism by creating a supermajority rule
for judicial appointments, highlighting Germany as the most prominent country with
such a rule." 3 In fact, constitutional courts composed under some variation of a
supermajority rule are typical in Europe. Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Spain each
appoint judges to their constitutional courts through a supermajority voting
procedure.1 4 While the appointments procedures in these countries are complicated
21 See supra Part II.
212 David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1491 (1992).
213 Ackerman, supra note 11.
214 Victor Ferreres-Comella, A Defense of Constitutional Rigidity 45, 57 n.3 1, Faculta di
Giurisprudenza, Universita degli Studi di Genova, http:f/www.giuri.unige.it/intro/dipist/
digita/filo/testi/analisi_2000/ferreres.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
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by factors that distinguish the courts from the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts, empirical evidence from these countries suggests that supermajority
rules have a moderating and consensus-forcing impact on the appointments process
without producing stalemate.1 5
The appointments process to European constitutional courts differs in various
respects from the process in the United States. In Germany, as Ackerman has em-
phasized, appointments are made under a supermajority rule and judges are limited
to a single twelve year term. Also, unlike in the United States, the nominating
authority is not vested in the executive branch at all." 6 Each house of the German
legislature appoints an equal number of members to the constitutional court subject
to a two-thirds supermajority approval requirement.1 7 Portugal has a similar two-
thirds supermajority rule for the ten of its constitutional court's thirteen judges that
are appointed by the legislature."' The remaining three are appointed by the
judges chosen by the legislature. 9 In Spain, eight of the twelve constitutional court
justices are appointed to a single, nonrenewable term by the legislature under a
three-fifths supermajority voting procedure. 220 The first third of Italy's fifteen-
member constitutional court is appointed by the president, with the remaining two-
thirds appointed by the legislature and the ordinary and administrative supreme
courts, respectively.221 A three-fifths supermajority is required for the five judges
appointed by parliament. 222 The nominations process to constitutional courts in
Europe thus differs in several key respects from the U.S. system. Not only are
judges typically appointed for single, nonrenewable terms, often at least in part by
national legislatures acting alone, but they also are typically appointed subject to a
supermajority voting requirement.
2' See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
216 See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONsTIUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 21-22 (2d ed. 1997).
217 Id. The Bundesrat appoints its half through a two-thirds vote of the body as a whole,
while the Judicial Selection Committee of the Bundestag, where party representation is
proportional to representation in the body as a whole, appoints its half subject to a two-thirds
vote.
218 CONSTrMIAO art. 222 (Port.).
219 id.
220 The House of Representatives and the Senate each appoint four of the court's twelve
members under a three-fifths voting rule. The government and the General Council of the
Judiciary each appoint two members. The Court is renewed by thirds every three years.
CONSTrrUCI6N [C.E.] art. 159 (Spain).
221 CosTrruzioNE [Cost.] art. 135 (Italy). Similar approaches have been implemented in
new constitutional systems around the world, including in Bulgaria, Korea, and Mongolia.
Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 49, 67 (2002).
222 William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits of Judicial Self-Restraint: Lessons
forAmericafrom the Italian Constitutional Court, 30 SETONHALLL. REv. 1, 12 n.33 (1999).
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The complicated appointments processes to Europe's constitutional courts
reflect political calculations animating constitutional architectures different from
those that exist in the United States, in part because of the lessons learned from the
American experience. Architects of these modem constitutional courts were aware,
as their American counterparts were not, of the powers a constitutional court would
wield. Creating courts with the explicit purpose of exercising judicial review, these
architects were unwilling to vest such power in a constitutional court without the
assurance that the court would be comprised of moderate judges. Moreover,
designing judicial appointment mechanisms in full awareness of the role political
parties would play, these architects have been almost uniformly unwilling to grant
constitutional courts the power of judicial review without the assurance that judicial
appointees would be impartial and moderate. 23 The appointment mechanism
typically has been one of the most important issues in designing constitutional
courts. 4 In fact, as part of a precommitment strategy, "[clonstitutional designers
are unlikely to adopt constitutional review unless they believe it will be carried out
by impartial appointees."'2' Particularly where constitutional designers believe they
will not be in a position to appoint judges, they are eager to avoid "overly partisan"
appointment mechanisms.226 Their task is to devise "an appointment mechanism
that will maximize the chances that judges will interpret the text in accordance with
the intentions of the Constitution writers.22 7 The overwhelmingly popular appoint-
ments mechanism, intended to encourage the appointment of moderate judges,
involves some sort of supermajority rule. Given the growth in size and power of the
federal courts since the founding period, as well as the influence parties have come
to exert over appointments, a similar supermajority rule may now be advisable in the
United States.
It would be rash to suggest learning from the European model without fully
understanding how these constitutional courts differ from American courts. In
addition to the historical difference just discussed, a key structural difference noted
above may explain why Europe's constitutional courts use supermajority appoint-
ments rules. The supermajority rules in Europe's constitutional courts may reflect
a concern embedded in an appointments process driven by the legislature, or any
other single branch acting alone. Investing a mere legislative majority with the
authority to appoint members to the constitutional court through a single-body
mechanism, as opposed to a cooperative interbranch mechanism as in the United
States, may have been seen to concentrate too much power. It is at least plausible
that the supermajority requirements were intended to serve as the same check on
223 See Ginsburg, supra note 221, at 65-66.
224 Id. at 65.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
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legislatures' appointments processes in these countries as the American Founders
believed the "advice and consent of the Senate" would provide on the executive's
nominations.
Without engaging in too much speculation on this point, it is nonetheless
possible to learn something empirically from Europe's courts. In Germany in
particular, as Ackerman has argued, "[t]here is an institutional incentive to converge
on the selection of judges with a reputation for impartiality and relative
moderation. 2 28 Empirical evidence shows that the supermajority rule has led to a
"norm of reciprocity" among German political parties, "produc[ing] a stable court
that reflects broad political preferences. "229 In several other European courts, an
equilibrium among appointments by majority and opposition parties has also
emerged.23° The appointments process in these countries is not as divisive or as
partisan as it is in the United States, in part because the process cannot be monop-
olized by a particular party at any given time. For those concerned about restoring
a measure of propriety to the American appointments process, a lesson could be
learned from these countries.
Despite the structural differences distinguishing the European constitutional
courts from American federal courts, the fact that their appointments processes have
produced moderate judges and dampened divisive partisanship suggests that a true
supermajority rule, rather than the polarizing Senate filibusters, would be a
consensus- and moderation-forcing mechanism in the United States. The German
court in particular remains independent and largely free of ideological tones because
no party can shape the court without the assent of the opposition. Under super-
majoritarian appointment procedures like those in Germany, no single party can lock
in a political program by capturing the judicial branch, and the stakes involved in
each nomination are thus lowered. While the European approach may tend to
prevent the kind of "transformative appointments" that have fundamentally reshaped
the U.S. Constitution,23" ' it adds an element of stability and moderation to courts that
helps preserve their integrity and perceived independence.232
.2 Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633,669 (2000).
229 Ginsburg, supra note 221, at 68.
230 CARLO GuARNIERI & PEDRO C. MAGALHAES, DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION, JUDICIAL
REFORM, AND THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE (Instituto de
Ci~ncias Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, Working Paper No. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.ics.ul.pt/publicacoes/workingpapers/ANTIGOS/seurjud.pdf (last visited Jan. 16,
2005).
231 Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1164 (1988).
232 A supermajority rule for judicial nominations actually may serve to reinforce the
supermajority rule required for constitutional amendments. Because of the stringency of that
rule and the difficulty of amending the Constitution, administrations often seek appointment
of Supreme Court Justices who will reinterpret and change the meaning of the Constitution.
This kind of substitution effect, using judicial nominations to reinterpret constitutional
provisions, could be counteracted by a supermajority confirmation process.
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Created over two centuries ago, the U.S. constitutional system could iearn
something from its more recently designed European counterparts. The prevalence
of supermajority rules for judicial appointments, in particular, merits consideration.
These supermajority rules have had systemic effects on European constitutional
courts. With lower stakes and a more consensual process, judicial appointments to
these courts are less partisan and less divisive than in the United States.
Supermajority rules have prevented individual parties from monopolizing judicial
appointments for a period of time and from attempting to lock in a particular
political agenda. Finally, as a result of consensus-forcing supermajority appoint-
ments rules, the courts are perceived as having great integrity and legitimacy and
being relatively free of partisan influence. Introducing or strengthening each of
these characteristics would benefit the American appointments process.
CONCLUSION
While filibustering judicial nominees has proven to be a problematic, polarizing
tactic that entrenches partisanship in the appointments process, a true supermajority
rule likely would be moderation- and consensus-forcing. Unfortunately, a super-
majority rule would be difficult to achieve politically. Ackerman recently wrote that
"there is little hope of enacting a constitutional amendment that changes the formal
rules for judicial selection. 233 He proposed instead that "[tihe Senate filibuster, for
instance, could become a regular part of the process," and that this "would serve as
a check on extremism in high court appointments. 23 4 Empirically, however, the
filibuster has not encouraged moderation in federal judicial nominations. To the
contrary, use of the filibuster has become a political issue itself, emboldening the
president to nominate candidates who approach the law from a particular perspec-
tive. Use of the filibuster has even created a substitution effect, encouraging the
president to resort to recess appointments that would command only a simple
majority if presented to the Senate. Thus, whether constitutional or not, the confir-
mation filibuster appears to be a strategy with only short-term, ambiguous benefits.
A true supermajority rule, politically difficult though it may be to achieve, would
be more likely to produce the kind of consensus and moderation Ackerman desires.
Other scholars have suggested alternative means by which a supermajority rule
could be achieved without a constitutional amendment. Ferejohn has argued:
[s]uch a reform can be implemented conventionally, as the
British changed their constitution. If members of the Senate re-
garded a two-thirds majority as required for appointment, they
233 Ackerman, supra note 11.
234 Id.
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could simply (but not necessarily easily) refuse to approve any
nomination that failed to receive that level of support ...
Whether senators would be capable of withstanding the partisan
heat that would be put on them is another matter.235
Ferejohn acknowledged the political difficulty with his argument - a majority party
member who committed herself to such a rule would no doubt incur serious political
costs. Others have argued that, because the Appointments Clause "does not declare
expressly that the consent required is by a simple majority . . . the majority
necessary for exercise of the consent power bestowed on the Senate may be altered
from time to time by ordinary legislation. 236 This argument suffers from the same
difficulty as Ferejohn's. The immediate beneficiary of any such legislation would
necessarily be the minority party, a bitter pill to swallow for senators in the majority
party. Beyond the political risks senators would face, it is possible that such a rule,
if used consistently, would receive constitutional scrutiny. While courts may refuse
to hear such a challenge based on the political question doctrine, it seems unlikely,
both for political and constitutional reasons, that such a reform could be adopted
either informally or via legislation.
Despite the immense hurdles a constitutional amendment would face, efforts
should be made to refashion the judicial appointments process. When the executive
and legislative branches are divided between the parties, internal incentives for
cooperation encourage the nomination and appointment of moderate candidates.
When governmental power is aligned in the hands of one party, however, that party
has the opportunity to leave a powerful and permanent ideological imprint on the
judicial branch. While aligned government may reflect an electoral mandate in
favor of one party, such a mandate should not include exclusive formative power
over the appointment of the third branch without Minority input and the moderating
influence that a supermajority voting rule would require. Allowing no single party
to place its stamp on the federal courts without the assent of the minority opposition,
such a rule would allow the federal courts to remain politically neutral and com-
posed of moderate judges. As Ackerman wrote in his original argument in favor of
the supermajority rule, such a rule would prevent "an ideological President with a
weak mandate [from] us[ing] a slim Senatorial majority to ram through a
constitutional revolution." '237
The supermajority rule is proposed here in the spirit of maintaining mainstream
and moderate federal courts and may be most appropriately applied to Supreme
Court nominations, where the stakes are highest. A supermajority rule would not
235 Ferejohn, supra note 11, at 67-68.
236 Massey, supra note 23, at 14.
237 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 407.
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rid the nominations process of ideological considerations altogether, espe.aliyj
where disagreement turns on an issue over which the parties cannot compromise.
It would prevent, however, a president whose party controlled the Senate from
locking in a political program through the nomination and confirmation of
sympathetic judges while tempering partisanship in the appointments process.
